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SECURITY INSTITUTIONS ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION
ROLES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
(The Euromediterranean Partnership and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Case Studies)

THESIS

by

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RESEARCH QUESTION

The Mediterranean security environment that emerged in the previous two decades created intense anxieties that resulted in institutional involvement in the region. However, the launching of the two western inspired initiatives - namely NATO’s MD and the EU’s EMP - proved not to be sufficient enough to handle the region’s problems either because of the latter’s complexity or due to inherent vices of each initiative. Apart from shared weaknesses, such as dealing with the protracted conflicts, the Dialogue particularly seems to face additional problems concerning its credibility and legitimacy to act in the region and its discriminatory character. Hence, the EMP has been elevated as the security leading actor in the region without completely supplanting NATO’s involvement or underestimating its potential value.
INTRODUCTION

Although a significant aftermath of the Cold War was the establishment of a remarkable series of security policies and actions in Europe and its periphery in general, scholars admit that those policies were mainly focused on Central, Eastern Europe and the Balkans which virtually neglected the Mediterranean basin—thereby relegating it to the margins. As Europe was becoming more and more secure in any aspect within its eastern neighborhood, the problems that rose across the Mediterranean basin and their implications for European security had gradually begun to gain prominence and forced Europe to focus on the South.

Due to the military capabilities gap and the absence of an actual *casus belli*, a traditional armed attack on Europe from the south shore, seemed like a science fiction scenario. However, local, regional and extra-regional events during the ’90s such as the Algeria crisis, the outbreak of the first Intifada in Palestine and the War in the Gulf resulted in the introduction of new type of threats that directly or indirectly affected the Mediterranean security as a whole and proved the interaction among North Africa, Middle East and Europe. Additionally, this emerged set of new non conventional threats had also a conceptual impact on Europe that was the expansion of the notion of security beyond the traditional military one.

Having had security questions becoming increasingly indivisible, regardless of diverse sub-regional features¹, Mediterranean soon became the part of the globe that included almost all kind of security issues whether hard or soft. Hence, the risk of spillover effects against the North shore of the Mediterranean constrained decision makers to act preemptively and launch of several institutional initiatives, among them the Mediterranean Dialogue of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Mediterranean Dialogue of the Western European Union (WEU), the Mediterranean Forum, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Summits, the Barcelona Process, and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This thesis investigates the role of the two most prominent, western-inspired security initiatives across the Mediterranean region—namely NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU’s EMP. Both initiatives and their overall performances have already been widely discussed by scholars. However, little or no attention has been given to specific criteria that affect their problem solving capacity. By drawing on a comparative analysis with focus on the crucial criteria of legitimacy and inclusiveness, which are the necessary and sufficient conditions a potential actor has to meet in order to be successfully engaged in a regional initiative, this thesis attempts to fill a current void in the bibliography.

The structure of this study is divided into four parts: In the first part, there will be an introduction to the Mediterranean security environment and its features. The second part, which includes chapters two and three, is a comprehensive review of the two initiatives mentioned above, the explicit reasons that engaged the two institutions (if the term institution is legitimate and also applies to the EU) and their reactions with an emphasis on their historical evolution. In the third part, this thesis attempts to evaluate the total performance of each initiative based on the criteria of inclusiveness and legitimacy to act. Finally, the discussion paves the way for some policy recommendations concerning the appropriate tools for dealing with the problems and the future challenges.

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2 For the purposes of this study from now on whenever we are referring to the Barcelona Process, the Euromediterranean Partnership or Union for the Mediterranean we mean the same initiative in the different phases of its evolution through time.

3 In this paper, the term institution refers to all three international organizations (e.g. OSCE), alliances (e.g. NATO) and entities (e.g. EU).
1. THE MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1.1 The Characteristics of the Mediterranean Security Environment

Many scholars argue that the Mediterranean can hardly be regarded as a regional entity; hence neither can be regarded as a regional security complex. However, there are at least three specific reasons that advocated for a broad regional Mediterranean security approach.

First, even though the region is not endowed with a significant inner coherence, there is no doubt that what characterizes the Mediterranean area is its quintessential inter-regional structure. Clearly a complex area with different security agendas yet the incongruity between security aspects does not obstruct the intimating link between the two shores of Mediterranean.

Second, the political spillovers, economic interaction and the expanded reach of modern military and information systems resulted in the growing interdependence of traditionally separate security environments and produced a significant gray area of problems that are neither strictly European nor Middle Eastern – but rather common Mediterranean.

Third, many security aspects cannot be adequately understood by viewing issues and crises in isolation since it is clear that also many of the security challenges around the Mediterranean basin sprang from similar trends. According to RAND’s analysis,

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6 “Transnational risks do not conform to international political constellations or mind sets trying somehow to slice a geopolitical area into nice subdivisions. For analytical purposes, one has to see an area as whole, using afterwards the existing political settings or devising new arrangements to implement an appropriate policy.” Alessandro Politi, “Transnational Security Challenges in the Mediterranean,” in Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millenium, ed. Stephen J. Blank, (Strategic Studies Institute, Pepperdine University, 1999), 38.
the existence of distinctive subregional issues does not eliminate the importance of broader, regional—indeed transregional—approaches to security problems.¹⁸

Hence, the Mediterranean has gained prominence to both NATO and EU because Europe was no longer “fire-proof” and especially since its littoral countries were directly exposed to the spillover effects of disorder in North Africa and the Middle East. After all, all north littoral countries are both EU and NATO members with Malta and Cyprus to enjoy only EU’s membership for the time.⁹

1.2 Grounds of intervention

The end of bipolarism and the systemic changes revealed several internal, bilateral and regional issues that used to be collateral in significance during the Cold War era, and which were covered under the “security blanket” of the coalitions’ antagonism. The sources of insecurity in the Mediterranean appeared were compounded, diverse and numerous, especially after the redefinition and expansion of the notions about security by the West to include non conventional type of threats. Let alone military in nature, this new type set of threats, often multidirectional and difficult to predict, loomed large.

The wider spectrum of the Mediterranean security issues encompasses a series of unresolved regional and inter-state conflicts, and a number of prominent functional security problems of a “hard” and “soft” nature.¹⁰ In a nutshell, the Mediterranean constitutes an area of strategic and socio-economic instability, with varying forms of political institutions, violent religious and cultural conflicts, differing perceptions of security and worldviews. Explicitly described, security anxieties in the region include inter alia Turkey's question, Lebanon's struggle, Algeria's civil war, the still-open Cyprus question, the Palestinian issue, Israel's relations with Arab world¹¹ and last but not

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⁹ Malta joined the Partnership for Peace Programme in April 1995 but suspended its participation in October 1996. At the Bucharest Summit, after Malta’s request the Allies have re-activated Malta’s participation in the (PIP). Cyprus does not hold Euro-Atlantic integration ability due to its international problem.
least, the everlasting modulating turmoil in Greek Turkish relations. Apart from the tug-of-war among the conflicts in the region, the problems of political legitimacy and internal stability that is closely tied to demographic and economic trends across the region amplify the tension. The dilemmas posed by the demographic burst and the expanding younger populations coupled with the backward economies and the pervasive stagnating markets have been widely discussed. From Morocco to Turkey, attempts for economic reforms and shifts to a more extrovert liberal private sector have widened the inequitable distribution of wealth and opportunities, adding much to destabilization. The underlying causes of social instability include a variety of negative indicators such as, double-digit inflation, demographic disproportions, high unemployment and illiteracy, constant internal migration to urban areas as well as uncontrolled migration to the north, environmental and health risks, rising transnational crime, and proliferation of weapons.

Furthermore, the dissatisfaction by virtue of the existing ruling political class’ inability to meet the needs of populations, both socioeconomically and politically, has fueled radical Islamism. As long as the ailing economies and the political conundrums prevail (particularly the Palestinian deadlock), the populations’ expectations - reality gap expands, thus fertilizing the ground for radicals to recruit followers. Political Islam remains the leading threat to regimes across the southern Mediterranean but at the same time is becoming an increasingly visible threat to Europe. The relatively massive migration and the existence of a considerable number of people (as residents or citizens) in the EU who have origins in the Mediterranean or the Middle East further complicates the picture as it makes Europe more vulnerable to spill-over risks. Additionally, the terrorist attacks in American territory as well as the post-9/11 on Casablanca, Madrid, London, and Istanbul have attested that radical Islamism and jihadist terrorism constitute a shared problem for the north and south. Those
events, as well as the way they were presented and colligated, lead to Islam’s securitization\textsuperscript{15} which added a cultural and religious fault line between the two shores that nearly revived the outdated Samuel Huntington’s theory of “Clash of Civilizations.”\textsuperscript{16}

Therefore, the security issues mentioned are not isolated and autonomous at all; contrariwise, they constitute communicating vessels that interact and interrelate in a large scale even with different in nature problems. This synergic effect could not be more aptly depicted than in the theoretical model bellow.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{mtd_model.png}
\caption{The Mediterranean Security Theoretical Model}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{15}According to the Copenhagen School, security is not an objective condition, but the outcome of a specific social process. Francesca Galli, \textit{The Legal and Political Implications of the Securitization of Counter Terrorism Measures across the Mediterranean}, EuroMeSCo Paper 71, September 2008, 5.

Whether demographic pressures and internal instability lead to the pattern of chaotic violence and failed states characterized by Robert Kaplan as "the coming anarchy," the Mediterranean basin certainly includes a number of societies where outcomes along these lines are possible.\textsuperscript{17} If one also counts in the strategic importance of the Mediterranean’s transit points (the Straits of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles/Bosporus Straits, the Sicilian Channel and the Suez Canal), all critical both in terms of the Euro-Atlantic anxiety for energy sustainability and security of supply, and the general stability and maritime trade and the environmental emanating risks\textsuperscript{18}, the justification for the institutional involvement is profound.

All the said factors that increased Europe’s vulnerability, led stake holders to deal with the Mediterranean through the use of various foreign policy tools such as the establishment of multilateral structures of security cooperation. After years in which the bilateral superpower relationship dominated the international security arena, the regional context was elevated and additional concepts such as “multilateralism” and “security communities” underscored that security was something that could be achieved by states through cooperative dialogue in a regional setting.\textsuperscript{19} Although states continue to be the central players in security issues, non-state actors more and more shape the mechanisms and structures through which security is provided.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Lesser, “The Renaissance of Mediterranean Security?” 3.
2. NATO’s ROLE IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA – THE YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION

The disappearance of bi-polar clarity in world politics brought a less predictable pattern\textsuperscript{21} and a redistribution of power. In this new reality, NATO appeared to be “a character in search of an author”\textsuperscript{22} since its principal concern to counterbalance the Soviets/USSR ceased to exist. During the immediate post-Cold War years, key events and extra-regional crises inevitably constrained the Alliance to move towards a holistic revision of its philosophy or otherwise face inertia and disablement.

The adoption of conceptual, functional and structural changes concerning the geographical mandate, the nature of threats and the means of countering them as well as the command structure were essential in order for NATO to adapt itself to the emerging security environment. The former strictly military nature and Euro-Atlantic geographical scope seemed to be outdated and insufficient, hence the attempt to transform from a military to a civil-military Alliance, the undertaking of new type missions and the out border action, updated NATO’s involvement and reinvigorated its role as a whole.

Once the Allies released the New Strategic Concept after the meeting of the NAC in 1991 and declared their intentions to undertake activities beyond the geographical jurisdiction defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO received an indefinable mandate.\textsuperscript{23} Apparently, the Mediterranean as an area of significant geostrategic gravity has been a de facto area of interest for the Alliance, hence it had an extra reason to be an area of application of the New Strategic Concept:

“\textit{The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace

\textsuperscript{21}Gerard Nonneman, \textit{Analyzing Middle East foreign policies and the relationship with Europe}, (Routledge Publications, 2005), 28.


\textsuperscript{23}“Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context.” North Atlantic Council, \textit{The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept}, 07-08 November 1991, Part I, paragraph 12.
of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown.”

In the years to come, the launching of the Mediterranean Dialogue became the core expression of NATO’s new strategies towards the region along with other initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Permanent-Joint Council with Russia (PJC) both in 1997 mainly aiming to extend a hand of friendship and cooperation to the former adversary republics of the former USSR. All the above composed the substantial proof of NATO’s extrovert transformation effort to switch from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization with the MD, EAPC and the PJC to function as the fora for consultations on political and security-related matters, and the PFP to represent practical aspects of the security cooperation.

2.1 NATO’s approach in the Mediterranean

NATO is not a new actor in the Mediterranean basin in that it has always had members on the northern shore since its establishment and that the Mediterranean

24 Ibid, paragraph 11.
25 Following the crisis in Yugoslavia and during the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Athens in June 1993, the first official declaration regarding the Mediterranean region took place. “Security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. Consequently, we encourage all efforts for dialogue and cooperation which aim at strengthening stability in this region. The example of our improved understanding and cooperative partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could serve to inspire such efforts. North Atlantic Council - Foreign Ministers / M-NAC-1(93)38, Athens, June 10, 1993, paragraph 11.
26 At a time of intense debates about the future functions of NATO and its priorities, the Allies did not have many resources to devote to the Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO’s launching of the PIP in January 1994 contemporary overshadowed the MD, yet it proved to inspire and reinforce the latter by its success in cooperating with former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe.
27 “PFP and EAPC are NATO’s most visible multinational instruments for shaping Euro-Atlantic security. But there is yet another instrument that we need to develop further if our goal of comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security architecture is to become a reality: the new partnership with Russia. This growing NATO-Russia relationship is perhaps the most innovative of the many new instruments NATO has created over the course of this decade. It signals most dramatically how much Europe — and NATO — have changed.” Javier, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (keynote address to 15th International Workshop on Global Security - Vienna, 19-23 June 1998) in Center for Strategic Decision Research, http://www.csdr.org/98Book/workshop98.htm (accessed March 01,2010)
28 The “Partnership for Peace Invitation” issued on January 10-11, 1994, stated that “This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership”, and added that “Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO”. North Atlantic Council - Foreign Ministers / North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace Invitation, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Press Communiqué M-1, (94)2.
29 “NATO members have always had a significant maritime presence in the Mediterranean, including the US Sixth Fleet. NATO itself for many years maintained a standing naval force for the Mediterranean”. Sir Peter Ricketts, UK Permanent Representative to NATO, “NATO, the
used to serve as NATO’s southern flank, yet secondary flank in terms of priority, during the Cold War. NATO’s specific focus in the Mediterranean was first expressed in the 1960s with “the establishment of the Expert Working Group on the Middle East and the Maghreb, and later—at a more political level—of the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. Composed of area specialists from allied countries, these groups conducted traditional monitoring of Soviet-related activities, as well as assessments of region-specific issues.”30 Apart from this Mediterranean dimension, which actually was part of higher strategic planning, only in the very recent past did the Alliance “begin to devote the attention and resources to turn this aspect of its agenda into a priority area”31.

Following the collapse of bipolarism, “the southern European countries traditionally active32 in Mediterranean affairs became more active and capable33, and were joined by countries such as Germany and Britain whose Cold War era concerns lay elsewhere.”34 On the other hand, Canada and the north European countries advocated for the launching of a Mediterranean initiative only when they were assured that the exercise would be cost free,35 would be at diplomatic level for the

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32Italy had proposed a Partnership for Peace (PfP) for the Mediterranean, which was to include political dialogue and specific military measures such as the exchange of military officers, seminars and courses, the exchange of military information and observers, joint exercises and joint operations in fields such as search and relief missions, the fight against illegal traffic, joint maritime control and PKO. Carlos Echeveria, Cooperation in Peacekeeping Among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces, (Chaillot Paper 35, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, February 1999), 3.
33 Major Mediterranean countries’ concerns with respect to NATO’s Mediterranean approach are their future leverage in decision-making inside NATO. Daniela Pippiti, “European Perspectives on Transatlantic Approaches to the Mediterranean”, (report presented at a conference was organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali - IAI in collaboration with the Istituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais-IEEI, Rome, March 31-April 1, 2000).
35 One of the key principles of the MD was and still is the self-funding of its activities. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners’ participation in the Dialogue. A number of measures have recently been taken to facilitate cooperation, notably the revision of the Dialogue’s funding policy thus allowing to fund up to 100% of the participation costs in Dialogue’s activities and the extension of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanisms to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. NATO Topics, NATO Official Site “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3C1FE4AD-0BDB8C34/natolive/topics_60021.htm (accessed 9 February 2010)
foreseeable future and would not divert NATO’s attention from central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{36}

The December 1994 Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council was a milestone for the development of the Alliance’s approach in the Mediterranean region since members’ dissension concerning whether they should “invest” in the region or not, gradually stood aside and they unanimously decided the launching of an initiative called NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

The Alliance’s decision to invite non member countries to participate in the Dialogue clearly expressed their ambiguous intention to establish a more substantial and broad cooperation in the region. This represented indeed, the first concrete effort on behalf of the Alliance to elevate the Mediterranean region as a domain of special interest yet it was only one of NATO’s official steps in adapting to the post-Cold War security environment overall. As Roberto Menotti points out the launching of an initiative concerning the Mediterranean did not actually signal a redirection of the Alliance’s priorities but instead was a modest addition to its numerous and fast-growing functions. Having no clear and present danger emanating from the region, the MD initiative did not stem from a compelling strategic rationale but essentially from NATO’s willingness to gradually give a \textit{touts azimout} international projection.\textsuperscript{37}

\subsection*{2.2 The Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative}

At the Brussels meeting in December 1994, NATO Foreign Ministers declared their commitment to launch the Mediterranean Dialogue by agreeing to “establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability.”\textsuperscript{38} As a result, the first round of the Mediterranean Dialogue took place on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{38}North Atlantic Council-Foreign Ministers Meeting/M-NAC-2 (94) 116, Brussels, December 1, 1994, par. 19.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
February 8 1995, initially to include five countries, namely Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia while Algeria joined later the same year and Jordan was invited in 2000.\(^{39}\)

2.2.1 Principles and Objectives

The Mediterranean Dialogue has been considered a key instrument in support of the Alliance’s overall strategy of cooperative security, built upon partnership, dialogue and cooperation.\(^{40}\)

Its official overall aim was, and still is, to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding, and to dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries.\(^{41}\) In order to achieve its objectives, the MD has been based upon five strategic principles (at least at declarational level).

- The first principle is “progressiveness” in terms of participation and substance, allowing extra participants to join and the Dialogue (witness the inclusion of Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in March 2000) and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time.

- The second is the Dialogue’s “bilateral structure”, in that it brings each of the participants and the Alliance together primarily in a NATO+1 format. Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the Dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).

- The third principle is “nondiscrimination” and “self-differentiation” meaning that while all the countries are offered the same menu of activities for co-operation, ranging from seminars and workshops in the field of information, science, environment, and crisis management to military co-operation, they are free to choose the intensity and extent of their participation\(^{42}\) through the establishment of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP).

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\(^{39}\) On strict geographical grounds, Jordan and Mauritania are not part of the Mediterranean. They do not have a Mediterranean coastline. Gareth Mark Winrow, 1.


\(^{41}\) NATO Topics, NATO Official Site, “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.”

\(^{42}\) Annalisa Monaco, A Greater NATO Role in the Greater Middle East? (NATO Notes, Vol 6, No 1. ISIS Europe, February 2004), 3.
• The forth is the “complementary” principle and regards the Dialogue’s intention to complement other international efforts such as the EU’s Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and the OSCE’s Mediterranean Initiative, as stated in NATO’s basic texts.43

• Finally, the last principle is the “self-funding” meaning that activities within the Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners' participation in the Dialogue. A number of measures have recently been taken to facilitate cooperation, notably the revision of the Dialogue’s funding policy thus allowing to fund up to 100% of the participation costs in Dialogue’s activities and the extension of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanisms to Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

Essentially the Dialogue has two mutually supporting dimensions - political and practical - but its objective is primarily political: to increase understanding of NATO’s policies and activities and get a better appreciation of the security needs of the countries involved.44 In this way, information exchange and political discussion at the level of Political Counselors has been at the heart of the Dialogue via the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, a forum created at the Alliance's 1997 Madrid Summit. Through this, Allies hold regular political discussions with either individual Dialogue partners, the so-called NATO+1 format, all seven Dialogue countries—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – the so-called NATO+7 format, or the NAC+7 format.45 The political dimension also includes visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The main purpose of these visits is to meet with the relevant host authorities and exchange views on NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as to get a better appreciation of each partner's specific objectives and priorities exploring their security needs.

43 See, for example, North Atlantic Council, Heads of State and Government Meeting, 8 July 1997/M-1(97)81, Madrid-Spain, par. 13. Also see North Atlantic Council- Heads of State and Government Washington Summit, 24 April 1999 / NAC-S(99)64 Communiqué, par. 29.
Parallel to its political goals, the Mediterranean Dialogue also seeks to foster practical cooperation through annual Work Programmes in security-related issues. Those programmes include—among others—seminars, workshops and practical activities in the fields of public diplomacy, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms & light weapons, defense reform and defense economics, consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Finally a major manifestation of the practical cooperation is the substantial military program (MP) that includes observing specific activities to be conducted under the responsibility of NATO Strategic Commands, NATO/PfP exercises, attending courses at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and at the NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy), on-site train-the-trainers sessions by Mobile Training Teams and visits by NATO’s Standing Naval Forces. Probably the culmination of the military cooperation so far, although outside the context of the Mediterranean Dialogue, was the cooperation of three Dialogue countries - namely Egypt, Jordan and Morocco - with the Alliance in the NATO-led peace-support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR).

2.3 Shaping through Evolution

After the Allies gained confidence that PfP was successfully established, they began to think the political and practical development of the Mediterranean Dialogue in a PfP-like fashion, focusing mostly on the field of civil emergency planning and civil-military cooperation. However, key events such 9/11, the Afghan and Iraq military campaigns and the terrorist attacks in Europe had a great impact on the Dialogue’s content and overall evolution.

The MD’s evolutionary process can be depicted in a nutshell through four milestones; the establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Washington Summit of NATO Heads of State and

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46 NATO Official Site, “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.”
47 We must point out that the official formulation of the MD policy defers from that of the Partnership for Peace. The “Partnership for Peace Invitation” issued on January 10-11, 1994, stated that “This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership”, and added that “Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO”. Thus, the difference between the PfP and the MD is explicit and substantial, and helps define the nature of the exercise undertaken by the Alliance toward a selected group of Southern shore countries. N.A. Stavrou and R.C. Ewing ed., “Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads”, (A Special Issue of Mediterranean Quarterly), A Journal of Global Issues, Vol.8, N.2, (Spring 1997), as in Roberto Menotti, 4.

In 1997 the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) was established to supervise the execution of MD’s programmes and future development. The establishment of the MCG reinforced the scope of political dialogue in three ways. First, the Alliance had a permanent body dealing with the Mediterranean partners. Second, by giving access to an Alliance body operating under the North Atlantic Council, NATO tried to increase the transparency and familiarized the Mediterranean partners with institutional cooperating procedures. Third the MCG allowed the Alliance’s member states to become directly involved in bilateral (NATO+1) consultations.

Two years later, the Washington Summit of NATO Heads of State and Governments in April 1999 elevated “partnership” into a “fundamental security task” in the 1999 Strategic Concept as the integral part of NATO’s cooperative approach to security. “The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO’s co-operative approach to security.”

All the same in the years to follow, the events of 9/11 and the decision to invoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, for the first time in history, triggered a fundamental shift towards the Mediterranean. This invocation was followed by a series of practical measures taken by NATO, inter alia the decision to send elements of the Standing Naval Forces (STANAVFORMED) to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping through Operation Active Endeavour. “Another measure, still on, was the enhancing of intelligence sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies”, as part of the

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50 Annalisa Monaco, NATO Enlarges and Braces to Fight Terrorism, ISIS EUROPE, Vol 6, No 2, April 2004, 8.
international campaign against terrorism. After all that, the Dialogue was not the stepchild of NATO’s outreach activities anymore but was rather elevated in essence and was put at the forefront of NATO’s strategic doctrine and turned into a flagship cooperation program.

Owing to the strong threat of terrorism towards NATO members and its partners, the attack “highlighted the need for Mediterranean parties to move closer together”. The NATO Heads of State and Government Prague Summit in November 2002 was a landmark in that Alliance leaders approved a package of measures to upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue as an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security.

The need for strengthening the Mediterranean dialogue further became even more pivotal after the US invasion in Iraq in April 2003 and the dissension among NATO members regarding the Alliance involvement. In the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders offered to elevate the Mediterranean Dialogue and to reach out to countries in the broader Middle East region, following the logic of the enhanced

51 The increased NATO presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling through the Straits by improving perceptions of security. While the mandate of Active Endeavour is limited to deterring and detecting terrorist-related activities, the operation has had a visible effect on security and stability in the Mediterranean that is beneficial to trade and economic activity. NATO Official Website, NATO Topics, “Operation Active Endeavour.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm (accessed February 14, 2010)
54 “We reaffirm that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We therefore decide to upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue as an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security. In this respect, we encourage intensified practical cooperation and effective interaction on security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as appropriate, where NATO can provide added value. We reiterate that the Mediterranean Dialogue and other international efforts, including the EU Barcelona process, are complementary and mutually reinforcing.” North Atlantic Council - Heads of State and Government Meeting, Prague, 21 November2002, Press Release(2002)127.
57 In December 2003 NATO nations decided to consult, before the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, our Mediterranean partners and interested countries in the broader region. Taking into account the views of the consulted countries, NATO has launched at its Istanbul Summit a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO’s outreach with, and cooperation to, interested countries in the broader Middle East region, through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, starting with individual members of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC)”. Nicola de Santis, “Cooperation Between ICI Countries & NATO”, (lecture at the Information Affairs Office of H. H. Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, United Arab Emirates, 18-04-2007).
Mediterranean Dialogue on areas of common interest\textsuperscript{58} where NATO can present added value that is to say hard security issues. The aim of the initiative was to enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region\textsuperscript{59} focusing on the ability of countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance (interoperability) against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Consequently, the new framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue incorporated more military cooperation than ever before.

For the years to come, NATO’s policy regarding the MD kept on being orientated in the same direction, considering the broader Middle East as the natural extension of the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{60} Equally, combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue to be among the highest priorities for the Alliance as official texts\textsuperscript{61} prove.

\textbf{2.4 Concluding remarks}

NATO reacted immediately to the global developments and attempted to transform in order to meet the new security requirements. Having originally satisfactory results regarding the former Warsaw Pact members, it was believed that NATO, through its new post-Cold War principles and a particularly targeted initiative, would be also able to provide the necessary preconditions to create a stable environment for Mediterranean countries to thrive in. However, as we will see in chapter four, the Mediterranean Dialogue proved to be both inconsistent to its stated principles and unsuitably equipped to handle the distinctiveness of the region – hence failed to achieve its major objectives so far.

\textsuperscript{58} All interested countries who subscribed to the aim and content of this initiative, declared willingness to cooperate in a number of practical priority areas listed in the policy document \textit{A More Ambitious and Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue}, released by NATO at the Istanbul Summit.


\textsuperscript{60} The security interests of NATO members have always been affected by what happens in the Maghreb and Middle East regions but only after 9/11 the Alliance paid attention to the existing continuity between the regions and started consider them as communicating vessels.

\textsuperscript{61} Riga Summit Declaration, NAC, 29 November 2006- Bucharest Summit Declaration, NAC, 3 April 2008 and the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, NAC, 04 Apr 2009.
Since the problems that the organization had sought to address were of political, economic and social nature, it is difficult for one to understand how they could be addressed exclusively through military cooperation. The Mediterranean Dialogue indeed produced some success, but it never fully reached its potential and objectives concerning regional security and stability or dispelling of misconceptions mainly due to the exclusiveness of some key countries in the region as well as to its inherent weakness to function as a normative power.


63 In practical terms, cooperation has increased tenfold in ten years. The number of joint activities has risen from sixty in 1997 to over 600 in 2007 covering 27 distinct areas. Pierre Razoux, *The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at a crossroads*, Research Paper No. 35, Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome-April 2008. Among the most noticeable, the participation of an increasing number of Partner countries in Operation Active Endeavour and the contribution of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco to the international peace force deployed under NATO and EU command in Kosovo.
3. EUROPE AS AN EMERGING ACTOR

The power vacuum which followed the aftermath of the Cold War’s finale reactivated the ambitious European countries that had been politically almost idle for years under the bi-polar regime. Specifically the European triumvirate, namely France, Germany and the UK, capitalized on the opportunity and expediently led the way to an extroversive, multipurpose, and multidirectional foreign policy campaign.

As Thomas Friedman claims, “If you don’t visit a bad neighborhood it might visit you”\(^64\) and at that time, Europe’s neighborhood was clemently sinister. All EC’s and later EU’s policies were born out of instrumental calculation, mainly in order to face the newly shaped security environment but also to benefit economically. Europe not only had to deal with its own “security deficit” but at the same time, the above mentioned redistribution of power constituted a unique chance for Europe to become manumitted from the US foreign policy and upgrade its international profile as a leading international actor.\(^65\)

Since the visible security threats were identified to exist largely in the region of the former Soviet Republics of central and east Europe, the Union placed its foreign policy’s centre of gravity eastwards. The EU gradually developed contractual relations and deployed selective normative means, through which finally managed to smoothly reform those countries and create a more secure environment.

After having defeated its greatest security threat to the East, the EU shifted its gaze south towards the Mediterranean,\(^66\) having been assisted by historical events and social trends that raised the security risk, such as the uncontrolled migration from south to north, the increasing religious fundamentalism, the political instability and


\(^65\)“But it will extend its policy to integrate the Arab South in terms of the structural dimension of its foreign policy, because Europe cannot be an important player on the world stage if it remains a subordinate agent in the area nearest to it.” Christian Leffler, Evolution not Revolution: the Barcelona Process, ten years on, in Ten Years after the Barcelona Process: Assessment and Perspectives, Mediterranean Yearbook 2005. Barcelona: CIBOD/IEMED, 2005, 2.

the proliferation of WMD\textsuperscript{67} that followed the Gulf crisis.\textsuperscript{68} Those emerging non-global and non-military risks (with the exception of WMD) could not be dealt with by NATO its own. They had to be tackled by the Europeans and “for this reason the EU was forced to take on the mantle of a security actor and gradually began to formulate and articulate a security strategy, mainstreaming security rationales in its policies.”\textsuperscript{69}

Those rationales based on a comprehensive notion about security risks and their causes, led Europe to adopt a functional multidimensional logic that was aiming to the creation of a common Euro-Mediterranean area of prosperity, stability and security. By giving emphasis to human security and on the latent power of economic, political and cultural regional relations Europe expected to create positive spillover effects different domains among others security.

Had Europe not chosen this idea of some Mediterranean solidarity, its credibility would have been jeopardized and the security outcome would be in doubt. There are several reasons for this: Firstly, any absence of solidarity would further divide the already asymmetrical developed shores. Secondly, it would have created feelings of rejection among the South Mediterranean countries which would consider themselves as inequable compared to the Eastern neighbors of Europe. Thirdly, it would equate Europe with all other international entrepreneurs and would damage what Europe had been boasting to be, - a distinctly different type of international actor.

3.1 EU’s Approach in the Mediterranean

From a pragmatist perspective, Europe’s vital interests in the region date back to the colonial era while the historical dominating bonds created in that period made Europeans consider the Mediterranean as their own backyard. Apart from the European littoral states whose geographic proximity justified contacts with their close neighboring south shore countries, France and the UK\textsuperscript{70} as traditional colonial


\textsuperscript{68} According to Haddadi, the Middle East and Europe are linked subregions, through Western Mediterranean which serves as a liaison security complex. Said Haddadi, \textit{The Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex: A Liaison between the European Union and the Middle East?}, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, JMWP No 24, November 1999,2.


\textsuperscript{70} Even today, the UK is present in the Mediterranean given its Gibraltar outpost and its sovereign base areas in Cyprus. Tobias Schumacher, “Explaining Foreign Policy: Germany, Poland and the United

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superpowers maintained their great influence in the region, while Germany as the largest member of the Union and the greatest economic power created a dense web of bilateral relations with a large number of southern Mediterranean countries during the nineties. However, as proved later on by the holistic and normative policies implemented from the Union towards the region, the European engagement was based on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism, ethics, peace and stability rather than national interests.

Starting with the European Community's bilateral cooperation agreements of the 1970s known as first generation agreements and the Global Mediterranean Policy during the Cold War era, the EC focused on the creation of a relation aiming exclusively at commercial, economic cooperation and bilateral financial protocols. Nonetheless, Europe kept relying on bilateral agreements with a focus on the aforementioned selective sectors’ enhancement and did not treat the Mediterranean as a unified entity with interconnected needs till the launching of the Revised Mediterranean Policy in 1990.

The rise of political Islam in Algeria in the early nineties, the precarious social and economic situation in the southern Mediterranean countries and the increasing concern about WMD proliferation after the Gulf War, prompted European countries to pay more attention to the Mediterranean region. Moreover, the recurrent speculations about possible domino effects considering the spread of Islamic

71“Germany has a special relationship—as a consequence of its national history—to the state of Israel and is emotionally committed to the survival and security of the Jewish State. However, German is not neglecting its good relations with the Arab states for the sake of the abovementioned reasons.”Ralph Thiele et al, Mediterranean security after EU and NATO enlargement. A joint research project between Military Centre for Strategic Studies and Bundewehr Transformation Center, CeMiSS, Roma 2005, 11.

72In 1972 the EEC had formulated its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). The GMP agreements mainly consisted of commercial co-operation (preferential trade agreements), financial and economic co-operation (aid) and social co-operation (directed towards immigrants). In 1990 the EU adopted the Revised Mediterranean Policy, which increased the budget for financial co-operation. EU-LDC Network, “Regional Focus-Policy. The Euro–Mediterranean Partnership / Barcelona Process,” in http://www.eu-ldc.org/themes/regionalfocus/regfocus_policy7.php (accessed February 23, 2010)

73For a comprehensive analysis of the Mediterranean Policies prior the Barcelona Process see Charalambos Tsardanidis, The EC’s Revised Mediterranean Policy and Greece, (Athens: Papazisis, 1992).(in Greek)

74The crisis in Algeria inspired or gave impetus to several Mediterranean initiatives. Since the early 1990s, it has driven concerns about the stability of societies facing demographic, economic, and political pressures across the region, and particularly in the western and central Mediterranean. Algeria in the first half of the decade was seen as emblematic of the challenge posed by radical Islamic politics to established regimes.” Stephen Larrabee et al., “The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps,” 7.
fundamentalism from Algeria to the neighboring countries of Morocco and Tunisia, was seen by Europe as an impending threat for stability in the whole south Mediterranean. The growing concern especially of the European littoral countries, which were directly affected by the rising of uncontrolled and illegal migration, was reflected on the launching of several middle size initiatives such as the 5+5 Dialogue in 1990, the Mediterranean Forum in 1991 and the Euro-Maghreb Partnership in 1992. This unprecedented multilateral liveliness in north-south relations was exclusively the outcome of the mutual interest of individual littoral countries for further engagement and cooperation between the two shores. Yet, the above initiatives were spasmodic, limited in content, participation, and means and hence limited in prospects. By “Europeanizing” their security worries and at the same time promoting the potential exploitation of their special relationship with North African countries, the littoral EU members tried to persuade other European countries to bring the Mediterranean as a whole into a high priority subject in EU’s foreign policy agenda. This effort on behalf of the littoral states in turn resulted in a major revamp the EU policies toward North Africa and the “upgrading “ of its relationship with the region to the level of a partnership during the Lisbon European Council in 1992, where the EU expressed for the first time the necessity for further intensified cooperation.

75 The creation of the “Five plus Five” in July 1990—originally established as the “Four plus Five” and later enlarged to include Malta later in 1990—was aimed at developing cooperation between Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Malta, on the one hand, and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania on the other. Discussion topics included natural resource management, economic links and financial assistance, immigration, and culture. The “Five plus Five” excluded military security discussions from the agenda; in that regard it presented a unique approach and may have generated greater interest in Arab countries keen to stimulate their economic development. Larabee et.al., “NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas.”

76 “Having been excluded from the “Five plus Five,” Egypt, in 1991, proposed the organization of the Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, or Mediterranean Forum. France cosponsored the initiative, and subsequently the Mediterranean Forum won the endorsement of Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal before being launched in Alexandria in July 1994. In Alexandria, the 10 founding members—Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey—admitted Malta as an 11th member. The participating states set up three working groups on political dialogue, dialogue between cultures and civilizations, and economic and social cooperation paving the way for the future framework of the Barcelona Process. Unlike the “Five plus Five,” the Mediterranean Forum focuses in part on security issues.” Ibid, 35.


78 The European Council underlines the importance it attributes to its general relations with the Mediterranean countries and welcomes in this connection the recent agreement on the renewed Mediterranean Policy which constitutes an essential element towards greater political and economic
Moving towards this direction, in June 1994 the European Council in Corfu confirmed the importance of Europe’s links with the Mediterranean, declared its will to strengthen the existing relations and stressed the need for regional cooperation in order to face common problems and establish peace, security and prosperity.\textsuperscript{79} Later on, in December of the same year, the European Council in Essen adopted European Commission’s proposals for the development of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership relation\textsuperscript{80} that finally led to the institutionalization of the Euro-Mediterranean relations in 1995 with the launching of the Barcelona Process.

### 3.2 The Barcelona Declaration – A shift in EU’s relations with the Mediterranean Countries

In late 1995, at a time when there was solid cause for optimism regarding substantial progress in achieving peace between Israel and the Arabs,\textsuperscript{81} the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 15 EU members and the 12 invited Mediterranean Partner Countries\textsuperscript{82} decided to redefine their bilateral relations in a more ambitious multilateral cooperation scheme.

The declaration\textsuperscript{83} adopted intended to establish a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of stability in the Mediterranean region.” European Council, Presidency Conclusions, SN 3321/1/92, Lisbon 26-27 June 1992, Chapter II External Relations-Paragraph 10.

\textsuperscript{79} “The European Council confirms the importance it attaches to the close links already existing with its Mediterranean partners and its wish to develop them still further so that the Mediterranean area may become an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and well-being.” “The European Council stresses the value for all Mediterranean partners of jointly examining political, economic and social problems to which solutions may be more effectively sought in the context of regional cooperation.” European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Corfu 24-25 June 1994, Chapter II Common Foreign and Security Policy-Paragraph A. Relations with the Mediterranean Countries.


\textsuperscript{82} The countries that participated were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. Libya was excluded due to its diplomatic isolation while the Union of the Arab Maghreb and Mauritania as a UMA member was granted the observer status.

\textsuperscript{83} The Barcelona Declaration is a political content document with no legal obligations induced. It describes and defines the Barcelona Process while its objectives are supposed to be materialized through the Work Programme adopted at the same meeting.” Constantinos Magkliveras, “Modern Developments in Barcelona Summit: The Creation of Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone” in \textit{The Mediterranean in the 21st Century: Problems and Perspectives}, J.Seimenis ed., (Rhodes: University of the Aegean, 2002), 49.(in Greek)
peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial partnership and a social, cultural and human partnership. For some scholars though, the EU progressively promoted the institutionalization of its relationships with the Mediterranean region in an attempt to counterbalance its enlargement towards the East while others consider it to be a preemptive action to avoid the establishment of a new Berlin Wall between the two shores meaning that new dividing religious and cultural fault lines could be set.

3.2.1 Principles and Objectives

The Barcelona Declaration has been an executive agreement comprising a set of general principles and common objectives in 40 sectors or so. Having a wider scope of cooperation than NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and addressing the Mediterranean as a whole, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s mandate was seeking for “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighborhood and history.” In order to achieve that, the Barcelona Process was based on three main guiding principles: equality in the partnership; complementing rather than displacing bilateral activities; and comprehensiveness, decentralization and gradualism in the approach.

Officially the Barcelona Process had three main objectives; to enhance political dialogue and security in a regional level, to create a regional free trade zone with mutual economical and developmental benefits till the year 2010, and to reestablish

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84 The participants expressed their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledged to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. They also agreed to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability. Declaration of the Barcelona, Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Barcelona Declaration, 27-28 November 1995.

85 “For some, the EMP scope is too wide. It is certainly true that the items listed for debate or action, are very numerous. It is also true that the length of that list is partially the result of package dealing, in which issues are added in order to have everybody on board. It cannot be denied either that, in several cases, the EMP is not the only or even the best level for dealing with the problem. This being said, it is equally difficult to demonstrate that any of the items listed is irrelevant for the EU and/or the Med partners. Narrowing down the EMP scope would then necessarily mean alienating one of the parties. The main answer to the question of the large number of items listed is therefore not to scratch any of them but to prioritize the allocation of human and financial resources.” Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future Challenges, CEPS Working Paper No.10, CEPS, Brussels, April 2003,1-4 and Table 1.

86 The Barcelona Declaration.

the socio-political relations among the people. According to those objectives the scheme of cooperation adopted statuted the following three pillars:

- **First Pillar: Political & security partnership** - Establishing a common area of peace & stability
- **Second Pillar: Economic & financial partnership** - Creating an area of shared Prosperity
- **Third Pillar: Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs** - Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures & exchanges between civil societies.

Just like the European integration that has been based on the logic of spill-over affects of the economy to other areas, the EMP attempted to functionally link economic and politics with security. As Youngs argues, “in designing the Barcelona Process, the EU’s philosophy was that economic and political objectives were symbiotic: economic reform would bring in its wake political reform, which would boost economic performance further, the latter helping to stem any potential for unsustainable levels of migration and thereby enhancing security objectives.”

However, one must point out that the Mediterranean partner countries lack the membership potential hence the “speak softly and carry a big carrot” approach of the EU could not be fully implemented. Again, for the establishment of a zone of peace and stability, the EU proposed an increased dialogue based on respect of

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88One can also notice extra similarities between the «Cooperation and Partnership Agreements» with Eastern European countries and «Association Agreements» put in place through the framework of the Barcelona Process, as well as the use of conditionality leverage in both of them. When talking about conditionality we are referring to its positive form such as political, economic or symbolic awards. As Smiths argues, “From normative perspective, positive incentives are viewed as being less intrusive into a third country’s sovereignty and thus less likely to generate psychological retrenchment and rigidity.” K. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, (London: Polity Press, 2004) as in Nathalie Tocci, *Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners*, CEPS Working Document No. 279/December 2007, 6.


91The basket-based architectural design of the project, its process-driven nature, and the low level of institutionalisation during its early stages are linked to the principle of conditionality. Conditionality takes the form of a “trade off” between financial/technical assistance from the EU (as opposed to its previous less rewarding policies) and an ethics of liberalisation based on socio-economic restructuring and, where possible, reconstruction. Dimitris Xenakis, *The Politics of Order-Building in Europe and the Mediterranean*, Defense Analysis Institute, No. 19, Athens, 2004, 116.
democracy, good governance and human rights.92 The three pillar scheme along with
the mobilization of social and political mechanisms as the means for reaching security
and stability depicts the comprehensive understanding of security in the Barcelona
Process to also include soft security threats.

Overall, the process was designed to operate through no less than three
organizational levels: newly created multilateral structures, updated bilateral
structures, and unilateral (intra-EU) mechanisms established to channel the funds
made available to support the process.93 Apart from the official level contacts, “the
Process has been supplemented by the creation of the Euromediterranean Study
Commission, dubbed the EuroMesco, which is engaged in unofficial dialogue with
official participation holding conferences on Euro-Mediterranean security issues.”94
Finally, the Barcelona Declaration also established the Euromediterranean Study
Commission as a mechanism to ensure that the objectives and principles it proclaimed
could actually be met in practice.95

By implication, the EMP marked a significant watershed in the EU’s effort to
create a subregional framework of preventive diplomacy.96 The Barcelona Process
depicted a qualitative transition in EU’s external relations towards the Mediterranean,
from a set of uncoordinated actions to a collective governance system based on
institutionalized rules and patterns. From that time onwards, the Barcelona Process,
being the culmination of all previous attempts, became the main European initiative
towards the Mediterranean region.97

92Carlos Echeverria Jesus, “Euro- Mediterranean Political Relations: Confidence and security- building
93Eric Philippart, The Euro- Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future
Challenges, 2 and Figure 1.
94Bracey’s Inc, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis & The Fletcher School of Law and Diplo macy
95This was the Work Programme which defined four instruments for monitoring the evolution of the
http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20&Itemid=36
&lang=en (accessed February 03, 2010)
96Bracey’s Inc, 78.
97For an overview of all EMP programmes see, European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean
3.3 Shaping through Evolution

In the years to follow the Europeans’ focus on the Mediterranean grew stronger, yet the EMP had to be modified or even supplemented by additional ones to meet the current challenges. The exacerbation of Arab-Israeli relations after the outbreak of the second intifada in late September 2000, the 9/11 attacks and the consequent US-UK military intervention in Iraq in April 2003 have all contributed to a substantially more insecure Mediterranean environment and at the same time shaped the Strategy for a Wider Europe and the European Security Strategy of 2003.98

In the Wider European Strategy, 99 the EU recognized that in the context of a new EU neighborhood policy (ENP), further regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration amongst the countries of the Southern Mediterranean has to be strongly encouraged. Based on the Association Agreements which were put formerly in place through the framework of the EMP, the EU used the mutually negotiated action plans in country-specific programmes in an effort to compromise between EU’s more traditional multilateral orientations in the region and more bilateral and differentiated approaches. By implementing that, individual countries were allowed to make expedient progress towards reforms without backwarding because of other countries’ deadlock and at the same time without jeopardizing the entire regional approach. Hence, the EMP and the ENP were designed to be fully complementary and to reciprocally assist each other in the establishment of a stable, secure and prosperous Mediterranean environment.100

Few months after the launching of the ENP, the EU’s need to continue being engaged with Mediterranean partners in the framework of the Barcelona Process was reiterated in the 2003 Security Strategy.101 In the document called “A Secure Europe

98 We have to point out that both strategies underlined the need for continued EU engagement in the region through the Barcelona Process.
100 “It (the Barcelona Process) is alive and well and being mutually nurtured by the Neighborhood Policy in their common quest for peace, security and prosperity in the region.” Christian Leffler, 2. Also according to an ISS Report “The Barcelona Process – the EMP - has already been integrated into the ENP, even though at least two states (Algeria and Syria) still remain outside the wider ENP structure.” ISS, Union for the Mediterranean, Building on the Barcelona Acquis, Report, 13 May 2008, 14.
101 The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered. European Council, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 8.
in a Better World” the Europeans declared their will to promote a ring of well
governed countries with which they could enjoy close and cooperative relations.102 By
namely adverting the number of challenges and threats that constituted
Mediterranean’s security matrix and defining the principles and clear objectives for
advancing EU’s security interests, the 2003 ESS articulated even more
comprehensively Europe’s security doctrine for the Mediterranean.103

In more detail, the European Security Strategy held that, if good governance can
be fostered in neighbouring states – i.e. if they can be assisted to become democratic,
prosperous and cooperative, the management of regional crises will be easier and
regional factors of instability with their spill-over effects can be brought under more
effective control.104 Consequently, the EU supported EMP’s task and maintained the
logic that conducting reforming policies through a normative fashion is the most
effective way to counter the security threats whether they were conventional, modern,
hard or soft. At the same time, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
the realization of its major element – the ESDP105 – the same year also contributed
remarkably to this direction.106

During the Barcelona’s Declaration anniversary Head of State Summit in 2005, a
Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism107 was adopted along

102 Ibid.
103 This introduction of all hard, soft, conventional and new type of security threats depicts the widening
of the security definition that has been adopted by the Europeans.
104 Aliboni and Saaf, 12.
105 “The European Union developed a Common European and Defense Policy with the objective of
providing the Union with military capacity, to have a stronger voice in NATO and to act when the
United States considers, as in Bosnia 1991-95,that their vital interests are not at stake.” Álvaro de
Vasconcelos, 1. All in all, thanks to ESDP, in Euro-Mediterranean relations the strategy of cooperative
security has been replaced by policies of security cooperation. The latter cover a large potential range
of initiatives stretching from cooperation in the event of disasters to cooperation in the framework of
PSOs and from the use of civilian to the use of military instruments. Aliboni and Saaf, 19. For a
detailed analysis about ESDP’s global and regional importance, see Sotiris Dalis and Tsakonas
106 Aliboni had foreseen that the EMP may become an important nursery contributing to the growing up
in the Mediterranean.” “Ever since the Union has progressively incorporated the fight against terrorism
into policies concerned with both its external relations and its security dimension, both the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and measures developed within the framework of the Maastricht Third
Pillar (originally called Justice and Home Affairs and now, because of its implications for external
policy, Freedom, Security and Justice) have assumed a more prominent role.” Francesca Galli, 5.
107 The countries of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, guided by the principles and objectives of the
Barcelona Declaration, are united in the struggle against terrorism. The threat that terrorism poses to
the lives of our citizens remains serious and terrorist attacks seriously impair the enjoyment of human
rights. We remain determined to strengthen co-operation and coordination to respond to this global
challenge. Today, we reiterate our total condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
and our determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors. European Commission, Euro-
with a forth cooperative pillar that was referring to Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security, proving once more the multidirectional security concerns of Europe towards the region. One year later, the Mohammed cartoon crisis in 2006 and Pope’s mistaken expression about the fateful vicious nature of Islam revealed the extent of misunderstanding between Arab Muslims and the Western World and how essential the intercultural dialogue has become. Again it was Europe’s approach that seemed to be more suitable to alleviate the crisis and minimize or prevent the resurface of similar questions. Having contained a cultural agenda (third pillar) and the relevant civil societies’ involvement, the EU has been working towards dispelling misconceptions and ignorance between the different cultures by encouraging contacts among people.

The last milestone concerning the EMP was the realization of President Sarkozy’s proposal for a Union for the Mediterranean at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in July 2008. The initiative was actually a re-launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, aiming to infuse a new vitality into the Partnership and to raise the political level of the strategic relationship between the EU and its southern neighbors. While maintaining the acquis of its predecessor (the Barcelona Process), the Union for the Mediterranean offered more balanced governance, increased visibility to its citizens and a commitment to tangible, regional and trans-national projects. “Some of the most important innovations of the Union for the Mediterranean included the rotating co-presidency with one EU president and one president

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109 For the increasingly important role of Islam in European policies see Sara Silvestri “Asserting Islam in the EU: actors, strategies and priorities” in François Foret ed., L’espace public européen à l’épreuve du religieux, Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles publications, 2007, 159-177.


113 President Sarkozy’s proposal touched a sympathetic chord in the South Mediterranean region. It promises Mediterranean partners the possibility of ownership of a shared policy.” Roberto Aliboni et al., Union for the Mediterranean Building on the Barcelona acquis, EUISS Report No1, 13 May 2008, 27. Moreover, the way in which its activities were to be selected in accordance with an agenda agreed across the Mediterranean allowed the South to address their own agenda.
representing the Mediterranean partners, and a Secretariat based in Barcelona that is responsible for identifying and promoting projects of regional, sub-regional and transnational value across different sectors.\textsuperscript{114} The Union for the Mediterranean also identified priority projects among which were the civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters.\textsuperscript{115} Concisely, the EU regarded the UfM as the multilateral interface of the ENP’s Mediterranean dimension in its attempt to boost a dynamic regional dimension. Additionally, the initiative has also been much more than a mere intergovernmental process of political cooperation for it created a crucial popular and social dimension with the engagement of people to people relations. Finally, one could say the UfM has been all but Eurocentric giving priority to south Mediterranean countries agenda and also sharing governance.

Five years after the first European Strategy, the EU expressed its determination to continue rising to the occasion and face the increasingly emanating complex of threats and challenges in its neighborhood, whether hard or soft, with the countersignature of the 2008 European Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{116} This strategy did not replace the previous ESS but remained fully relevant with it recognizing that despite the substantial progress been made, there was actually a work in progress.\textsuperscript{117} As far as the Mediterranean was concerned, the official document praised the overall performance but also highlighted that the Mediterranean, as an area of major importance and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} UfM’s relation to security and cooperation on security is less connected with actual policies – as in the case of the ENP – than the process which is expected to develop in the future – as was the case with the EMP. The most important objectives of the UfM are a collective political dialogue and the implementation of large-scale regional projects (having a mostly economic, social and cultural orientation) the UfM seems to espouse the idea that more economic-financial integration and cooperation in the region may ultimately constitute, at first, a platform to enhance human security and, once this platform is strengthened, the pre-condition for a political and security common ground in the longer run.” Aliboni and Saaf, 16.
\item \textsuperscript{116} EU must define more clearly its ambitions concerning its role in the world and that it should not try to become a superpower like the US but that it should guarantee its security, work for stability in its neighborhood, and contribute to a multilateral global system of security within the framework of the United Nations, ensuring respect for international law and effective crisis and conflict prevention, as well as post-conflict management and resolution.” European Parliament, European Security Strategy and ESDP, 2008/2202(INI), 19 February 2009, Brussels.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges hence there was no room for complacency.  

3.4 Concluding remarks

Even though in time the ways of approaching the Mediterranean and the strategies adopted have undergone shifts and alterations ranging from bilateral to multilateral relation promoting and from asymmetrical interdependence to co-ownership and co-governance, Europe’s strategic objective to promote stability and prosperity have remained unchanged. To meet both traditional and modern challenges, and to move beyond the regional structural constraints, EU attempted and in great extent managed to synchronize effectively all its foreign policy instruments. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as an important political instrument of the European policy towards the Mediterranean, along with and in compliance to the ENP and the ESDP, remains the most ambitious initiative in the region.

Given that there are real risks and threats in the region, and taking into account that the United States has adopted a strong policy and that NATO’s MD initiative is actually unsuitable (as we will see in chapter four) to deal with the distinctiveness of the region, the Europeans were obliged to be slightly different in their approach. In Europe’s perspective, socioeconomic and cultural problems are multi-faceted and interlinked hence the terminus of overall regional stability and prosperity is interrelated with the combination of an anthropocentric rather than just state-central security. The realization of this perspective through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership along with its normative power and the inclusiveness it promotes seem to be EU’s comparative advantages.

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118 "The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners." Ibid 7.

4. ASSESSING NATO AND EU INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

As proven in the previous chapters, the reasons of involvement in the region and the vision about a stable and secure Mediterranean are something that the EU and NATO have been sharing. However, their different characteristics of approach; different track record regarding the use of power and their different levels of acceptance have lead to different outcomes. An assessment of their overall progress evinces that the EMP seems to be more capable and effective in dealing with the regional problems, primarily due to its inclusive approach and its wider acceptance on behalf of the MNCs. On the contrary, it is NATO’s discriminatory character and particularly its lack of credibility that holds back progress on the Dialogue’s objectives and justifies its poor performance.

4.1 The inclusiveness criterion

The more countries submit to participate in a security initiative of a region, the more feasible a concrete regional security arrangement seems to be. However, in times of regional institutional cooperation, the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion has not vanished at all and NATO’s MD is an exact paradigm where the above mentioned rule of thumb does not apply.

The paradox is that unlike the EMP which works on a pan-regional basis, NATO’s MD has selectively chosen to exclude countries that geographically should be included, and to include countries that geographically are not justified to do so! Specifically, four countries located in the Mediterranean basin are not participating - namely Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian Authority (if the term country for

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120 Any negotiation on the definition of a common area implies to define the limits of this process (Exclusion)”. Thomas Demmelhuber, The Euro-Mediterranean Space as an Imagined (Geo)political, Economic and Cultural Entity, Discussion Paper 159, Bonn, 2006, 6.

121 Cyprus’s exclusion as well as its transatlantic future in general, has been a victim of the former’s turbulent relations with Turkey and the Cyprus Issue. However, the protracted conflict and Cyprus exclusiveness from either a full membership or a partnership in the Dialogue framework has cost
the Palestinian Authority is approved). On the other hand, Jordan and Mauritania, even though don’t belong to the Mediterranean basin, actively participate in different kind of Dialogue activities.  

4.1.1 The Dialogue’s selectivity - Origins and impact.

If we interpret the official NATO document regarding the MD launching, we reach the conclusion that the method initially applied to the Mediterranean Dialogue was supposed to be “reactive” and “gradual”. “Reactive” in the sense that NATO’s primary goal was to dispel mistrust about its objectives and to promote a better

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122 Dokos and Pierros, 67-68.
understanding of the Alliance in the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and “gradual” because the Dialogue was effectively designed as a gateway through which to identify and develop areas of cooperation\textsuperscript{123} and that it had no restrictions as far as the participation of countries is concerned. This expansive reach and the possibilities it opened up argued for inclusiveness. But the imperative for NATO to maintain its core capabilities and effectiveness as a military alliance argued for selectivity, especially in the acceptance of new members.\textsuperscript{124} Accordingly, it follows that without achieving full inclusiveness, there is no Mediterranean policy as a whole and NATO clearly fails in one of its core objectives.

Indeed, one of the critical issues for the Dialogue countries was the composition of the group itself – why each was chosen to participate in the dialogue and why others were excluded.\textsuperscript{125} Each of the chosen countries\textsuperscript{126} was perceived to be a moderate, Western-looking, constructive (as defined by the West) participant in regional affairs and have diplomatic and political ties with one another.\textsuperscript{127} Consequently, with the exception of Cyprus, all the others that did not meet the criteria were indirectly characterized as radical and incapable or unwilling to add value to any regional security framework.

All the same, NATO’s selectivity continued to be expressed through the establishment of the ICI in 2004 which expanded the potential geographic space for security cooperation between NATO and Dialogue countries eastward all the way to the broader Middle East. Based upon the principal of inclusiveness, ICI was opened to all interested countries in the region who subscribed to the aim and content of this initiative\textsuperscript{128}, particularly the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, we must point out that once the Dialogue expanded its ultimate limits, the center of gravity was not the Mediterranean anymore. Therefore, this expansion reflected a qualitative shift from an initiative aiming towards a region

\textsuperscript{123}Masala, ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Dokos, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects and Policy Recommendations, 37.
\textsuperscript{126} From the Alliance’s viewpoint, there are major differences among the various state actors in the “greater Mediterranean” region. At least four categories can be identified – with the possibility for each country to shift from one group to the other: the Dialogue partners, “grey” countries (Syria, Lebanon, Algeria), “black” countries or “rogue states” (Iraq, Libya, Iran), countries belonging to a de facto “American reservoir” in the Persian Gulf and the Arab peninsula.” Menotti, 12. (Today, Algeria is a Dialogue country while Syria is definitely considered to be a rogue state by NATO and the USA.)
\textsuperscript{127} Larrabee et al., The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, 57.
\textsuperscript{128} Nicola de Santis, ibid.
(the Mediterranean) to an initiative towards a specific threat (terrorism), proving that NATO’s motivation was simply to seek support for the US-led anti-terrorist campaign\textsuperscript{129} rather than reinforce the MD.

Moreover, the submission to the initiative of countries that were not Mediterranean but at the same time were Arabic further emphasized the \textit{de facto} isolation of the non partner Mediterranean Arab countries and minimized the possibilities of an enhanced regional Mediterranean cooperation.\textsuperscript{130} Instead of materializing its declared principle of inclusiveness NATO chose in practice to put in the margins the so called “problematic states” namely Syria, Lebanon and Libya and hence propagated and aggravated the already strained relations between the Alliance and those countries.

This discriminatory logic could be interpreted in two ways. Either NATO did not actually want to attempt to transform them, which means they served as the “new artificial enemy”\textsuperscript{131} and thus they gave NATO’s a \textit{raison d'être} after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, or NATO was incapable of acting as a normative power to transform them. The second scenario seems more realistic and conceivable.

Consequently, the Dialogue itself fails also in its second main objective that is to “achieve better mutual understanding; and dispel any misconceptions about NATO.” Especially when it comes to Syria, which is a key-country for the regional security \textit{per se}\textsuperscript{132}, its exclusiveness from any security configuration in the region leaves even less room for security cooperation and reproduces the mutual feelings of rejection. As a result of the above, Syria - the last Arab state in the Middle East that is independent in its policy making\textsuperscript{133} or at least it is the last (after Libya’s return to the international

\textsuperscript{129} As Costanza Musu argues, “the establishment of the ICI could be seen as a direct consequence of the American desire to forge a strategy for the Broader Middle East, a strategy in which an autonomous Mediterranean dimension is less relevant if not altogether subordinated to the relations with countries of the Middle East and of the Gulf.” Musu, 7.

\textsuperscript{130} “For on a general conceptual level, the exclusion of any Arab state is considered unacceptable by other Arab states in any setting where multiple Arab states are represented. This absence is further magnified by the inclusion of Israel in the initiative.” Larrabee et al., 57. “The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps,” 57.

\textsuperscript{131} The Dialogue was created with the objective to help “correct any misconception that may have arisen with regard to NATO activates and to dismantle the myth that an Alliance in search of new, artificial enemies to the South.” Bin, “NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: A Post Prague Perspective. 2.

\textsuperscript{132} Syria’s open dispute with Israel about Golan Heights, its position concerning the protracted Palestinian issue, as well as its close ties with Iran completely justify the label “key-country” for regional security and stability.

community) that is not aligned with NATO and the US - naturally sought for external counterbalance that lead to its rapprochement with Russia and China\textsuperscript{134} which in turn added extra frustration to NATO and the US and maximized the security dilemma. “The same is true for Lebanon, which is essentially a Syrian client.”\textsuperscript{135}

4.1.2 EMP’s non-discriminatory approach. Origins and impact.

After analyzing the impediment caused by NATO’s selectivity we could say that one of the most important strategic advantages of EMP is its absolute inclusiveness. Having zero exceptions in participation and no intention of including any “alien partners” the EMP is strictly inward-looking to the Mediterranean region and its problems.

Unlike NATO’s discriminatory policy, the EU embraced all MNC’s regardless their socio-political features and ever since attempted to smoothly transform them in order to materialize its vision for a region of prosperity and stability. Indeed, “the originality of the EMP process, in comparison with NATO’s MD, lies in its ability to bring together all countries of the South and North in a dialogue about a shared political space.”\textsuperscript{136} This representation is the normative underpinning for the building of a regional security partnership based on mutual respect and therefore mutual trust\textsuperscript{137} and also the factor that boosted EMP’s acceptance and EU’s involvement in the region in general. After all, the EMP is the only official forum\textsuperscript{138} in which interlocutors such as Israel and the Arab countries, which make “strange bedfellows”, can sit around the same table to discuss an achievement per se.

\textsuperscript{134}“Russia has returned to the region after almost 20 years primarily in the energy sector and as a supplier of defense goods and services to Algeria and Syria along with China which historically has had a leading role as a defense partner in Algeria’s nuclear program and as a supplier of ballistic missile technology to Egypt, Syria and Libya.” Lesser, Rediscovering the Mediterranean. 4 passim.

\textsuperscript{135}Larrabee et al., “NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas.” 86.

\textsuperscript{136}In the new landscape developed after the end of the Cold War, “the EU had considerably better chances to project stability and prosperity in its near abroad through a system of mutual governance.” Dimitris Xenakis, From Policy to Regime: Trends in Euro-Mediterranean Governance, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. XIII, No 1, Autumn-Winter 1999, 256.


\textsuperscript{138}“While there is much criticism of the effectiveness of the forum, there is a basic acceptance of its overall positive intention and nature.” Landau and Fouad, 23.
However, one could claim that the EU does not take advantage of Turkey’s participation in the EMP and its potential role\footnote{Turkish potential role derives from its cultural ties with the region and its unique characteristic/status of been the only Muslim country that is a NATO member.} as a mediator in developing confidence and mutual understanding or that also the EMP does not include key countries that could assist in the establishment of an effective regional security framework, such as the United States. Both claims are easily rejected.

Apart from the fact that Turkey itself has been responsible for the security deficit in the region,\footnote{“Chances for regional co-operation would dramatically increase if a viable solution for the Cyprus question is found and Greek-Turkish relations could further normalize. Dimitris K. Xenakis and Tsardanidis Charalambos, “Greece's Mediterranean Perspective and the French Initiative” in Xenakis and Tsakonas, ed., \textit{138}.} having occupied more than 30\% of Cyprus and ignoring the UN Resolutions\footnote{The United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 3212 and UN Security Council Resolutions 365(1974) and 367(1975) called for withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, return of all refugees to their homes in safety, and continue efforts for mutually acceptable political settlement.} referring to it, Turkey also keeps a passive stance regarding the EMP initiative. Turkey’s persistent counter-productive behavior originates from its fear that any serious engagement may become the full membership “cheap substitute” that will permanently replace the country’s European prospects.\footnote{For a presentation of Turkey’s aspects see Aslı Toksabay Esen, \textit{EMP, ENP and the Mediterranean Union: A Turkish Perspective}, Institute for International Economic Relations (IDEC), \url{http://www.idec.gr/iier/new/EN/Ensen-EMP,%20ENP%20and%20the%20Mediterranean%20Union-A%20Perspective.pdf} (accessed February 11, 2010)\textsuperscript{142}}

When it comes to the US, the answer is even more obvious. Should the EMP ask for extra USA engagement in the region, its credibility would have been affected in a similar way as NATO’s MD and it would have trammeled its attempts to promote any form of security cooperation.

4.2 \textbf{The legitimacy-credibility criterion}

\textbf{4.2.1 NATO’s legitimacy-credibility deficiency and the US role}

Another critical factor that affects the Dialogue’s overall performance is NATO’s lack of credibility and legitimacy\footnote{“At the most abstract level, legitimacy is the notion that a person or group of people has the right to lead and make decisions on behalf of a group of persons within a geographic area.” Coridon Henshaw, “Political Legitimacy in the European Union”, essay posted 16 April 2007. \url{http://www.talisorder.ca/essays/EULegitimacy.pdf}} to act in the region. The role of external actors
penetrating the Mediterranean can well be a cause of displeasure\textsuperscript{144} for the majority of the countries in the region, all the more if we are referring to NATO and its basic and most controversial member - the US.\textsuperscript{145} With the exception of Israel, all South Mediterranean countries have perceptions that are predominantly haunted by NATO’s legacies, US policies, and the close relationship among them.\textsuperscript{146} An example often quoted by the Arabs is the invasion in Iraq and the intervention in the Balkans in the nineties.

In the Iraq case, the whole Islamic world wondered why Sadam’s aggressiveness was combated immediately while Israel’s aggressiveness regarding the Palestinian\textsuperscript{147} issue was downgraded at a diplomatic level, and why Sadam had to abide by the UN Resolutions while Israel had been allowed to violate all UN Resolutions except the one that refers to its recognition.\textsuperscript{148} All the above questions created the notion that it is all about promoting America’s vital interests concerning energy and supporting its strategic ally – Israel.\textsuperscript{149} This also means that the often very negative perception of US foreign policies in the region, in particular in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, inflict on NATO’s image as a whole. Hence the US leading role in NATO harmed NATO’s credibility, reduced its potential legitimacy for involvement and created deep skepticism among Arabs about its intentions.

\textsuperscript{144} Aliboni, “The Role of International Organisations in the Mediterranean”.
\textsuperscript{145} “Another popular misconception is that NATO equals the United States. While the United States is indeed a major NATO ally, it is only one of 26. (Today NATO counts 28 members). Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, “NATO, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: The Successor Generation”, (lecture given at RUSI, Whitehall, London, 29-30 Nov 2004).
\textsuperscript{146} As Nicolas Burns admitted, “I am firmly of the view that NATO will remain central to American national interests and to those of our European Allies for as far into the future that we can see. NATO is vital because it is America's only permanent bridge to Europe; it is the expression of our commitment to each other's defense; it is the vehicle through which we continue to maintain the peace in Europe and by which we must now address threats outside of Europe.” Nicholas R. Burns, “The Future of NATO” (testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1, 2003) in Global Security Organization \url{http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/burnstestimony030401.pdf} (accessed March 12, 2010)
\textsuperscript{147} In lieu of the term “Arab-Israel conflict” which wrongly still prevails, the author uses on purpose the term “Palestinian Issue” because after the recognition of Israel from a number of Arab states the Issue was no longer pan Arabic but actually solo Palestinian.
\textsuperscript{149} The US-Israel love affair has a long story. Apart from the establishment of the state of Israel with its backing, pro-Israeli US policies has been ensuring Israel’s security for the last five decades with Israel’s serving as US interests guarantor in the region in return.
In the late nineties, NATO’s action in Kosovo without former UN approval opened the issue of the UN’s role in international relations. The anxieties now touched the sensitive subject of sovereignty, and the fear that prevailed was that NATO could also act against any Arab country without authorization of the global community. Furthermore, the expansion of NATO’s interests and scope of action followed the Alliance’s launching of the MD and the release of the New Strategic Concept, raised additional questions among Arabs about how far NATO’s geographic mandate extends and what the criteria for intervention are.

As far as the US is concerned, apart from its diachronic pro-Israeli policies, utilitarian reasons -above all energy security and the more recent search for pivotal states to support their fight for terror campaign-gave additional ground to get involved in the region both individually and through the Alliance. In that sense, and given the correlation between NATO and the US, the latter’s presence in the region not only did not contribute to upgrading NATO’s damaged profile but also hindered NATO’s undertaking since the Arab countries identified a different reality behind NATO’s official declarations. The Alliance’s growing out-of-area dimension and outreach activities expressed through NATO’s Strategic Concept and MD were combined with

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150 Regarding Kosovo, NATO members consider it to be the exception not the rule and deny that a precedent is set for future actions. See Joschka Fischer, (speech given at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 8, 1998).

151 Former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes’ description in the mid nineties of Islam as “at least as dangerous as Communism was, clearly justifies Arab anxieties about NATO’s purposes”. Ahmed Nafeez Mosaddeq, Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq. (New Society Publishers, September 2003), 12.

152 Just in time for NATO's 50th birthday, heads of the Alliance states signed the most offensive strategic document in the organization's history. Known as the ‘New Strategic Concept’, the text reads as a license for world-wide interventionism. The new risk criteria that are relevant to the region are numerous, and can be manipulated at any time to suit the West's needs.” Karim El-Gawhary, “NATO Bill of Rights”, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No.431, 27 May-2 June 1999, Available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/431/in2.htm

153 “When asked about their understanding of the concept of regional security, interviewees from the Maghreb often stressed the importance of regional cooperation -and unity- as an essential means for precluding outside powers from intervening in regional state affairs. This reading of the term – namely, security as freedom from outside interference and intervention in their affairs – would not be the most readily apparent for Israelis, for example, for whom security translates most prominently into freedom from military threats to its existence. Moreover, in certain scenarios Israel depends on the strong support of the US to enhance its security – for example, with regard to the threat from Iraq in 1991, or with regard to Iran at present.” Landau and Fouad, 8.

154 As Kagan points out, in the post Cold War era, great powers have actually three alternatives to chose from when implementing their foreign policies. They can act either independently, develop bilateral relations, or get involved in multilateral associations. During the last decade, the USA has followed a blend of all three alternatives as methods of implementing its foreign policy, still with a tendency into unilateralism. R.Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (New York: Alfred A.Knopf publishers, 2003) as in Stephen Calleya and Xenakis Dimitris, Security & Strategic Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Confidence Building & Conflict Prevention ELIAMEP Policy Paper No11, 6. (in Greek).
America’s policies and perceived as pure threats.\textsuperscript{155} According to analyst Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “through the Dialogue mechanism the Mediterranean Sea has virtually become a NATO lake” almost surrounded by NATO members or de facto NATO members.\textsuperscript{156} This situation is interpreted as supportive to USA’s broader objective to control the coastline of the Eastern Mediterranean as well as both the Middle East and North Africa for their own interests – mainly the control of energy resources.\textsuperscript{157}

Those perceptions of the past regarding NATO as the USA’s vehicle\textsuperscript{158} have not been reduced but rather reinforced by time. Truly, after the launching of ICI, the affiliation\textsuperscript{159} to it of the so-called moderate countries - the Gulf states- paved the way for the virtual creation of a “NATO for the Middle East” in order to effectively combat the new global threat of terrorism from Islamist extremists.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{155}“NATO is perceived more as a potential security threat than as a potential partner and security provider. The Mediterranean countries are skeptical about the intentions and agenda of NATO in the region, and fear that the Dialogue will be used as a leverage to mingle in their internal affairs or even as an excuse for outright military intervention.” Helle Malmvig, \textit{A New Role For NATO in the Middle East? Assessing Possibilities and Barriers for an Enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue}, DIIS Report No 8, 2005, 13.

\textsuperscript{156} Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, ibid.

\textsuperscript{157}“The administration believes you have to control resources in order to have access to them, Chas Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia under the first president Bush, as in William R. Clark, \textit{Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq and the Future of Dollar}, (New Society Publishers, 2005), 116. This statement was inspired by James Akins, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia who said that “you have to control resources even if this required taking over the Arab oil fields and bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them.” as in Robert Dreyfuss, \textit{Devil’s game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam}, (Metropolitan Books, November 2005),248.

\textsuperscript{158} Arab Studies specialist Professor Hudson’s words shortly after the end of the Cold War prove the correlation between NATO, USA and the latter’s interests about Israel and energy security,”“The Soviet Union is gone, Israel has not only survived but has become a regional superpower, \textit{pan-Arabism} is a spent force, and Arab oil (most of it, anyway) is in hands of friendly dependent regimes.” Michael C. Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Toward the Middle East”, The Middle East Journal, 50/2, (Summer 1996), 336 as in William L. Cleveland, \textit{A History of the Modern Middle East}, (Westview Press, third edition, 2004), 520.

\textsuperscript{159} According to Alaa Abd Alaziz, the Arab MD countries have been predisposed to bandwagoning behaviour with the dominant powers NATO and the USA. The main reason of this behavior is that the nondemocratic ruling regimes face internal problems and know that in the absence of any internal support of their policies they have to seek the support of NATO member states in order to remain in power. See Alaa A.H. Abd Alaziz, \textit{Balance of Threat perception And the prospects of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue}, Final Report for the Institutional Research Fellowship Programme 2001-2003, University of Helsinki, June 2003. When it comes to Gulf countries, the US message “You are either with us or against us” determined their position. However in both cases civil societies remain prejudiced against any cooperation with NATO.

\textsuperscript{160}This new version of NATO might be called NATO: the Mideast Antiterrorism Organization, a military, police, intelligence and security mutual-defense alliance between the West and our moderate allies in the Middle East. This NATO alliance would include the countries that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on her recent trip to the region, referred to as the "mainstream" and "moderate" Arab nations: Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Walter Isaacson, “A NATO for the Middle East”, \textit{The Time Magazine}, 26 Jan 2007. Available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1582321,00.html
George W. Bush announced in a speech in Iraq in 2007 that the US intended to build a coalition against Iran, Syria and all regional players and forces that resisted the White House’s “New Middle East.”\(^{161}\) At the same time, the mainstream media and the analysts calling for the expansion of NATO into the Middle East or the creation of a NATO-like alliance in the region confirmed the intricate ties between the US foreign policy and NATO once more.

### 4.2.2. Europe’s overall acceptance

Europe has managed better than NATO or any other institution or single state to channel both governments’ and civil society’s preferences of the region and became genuinely appreciated as an overall acceptable and legitimate actor.

As a study recently conducted by the Anna Lindh Foundation among 13,000 people of 13 Euro-Mediterranean countries showed, the societies of the region have invested in the Euromediterranean Partnership and have great expectations\(^ {162}\) proving that the initiative is fully accepted. As David Beetham argues, “legitimacy is not the icing on the cake of power, which is applied after baking is complete, and leaves the cake essentially unchanged. It is more like the yeast that enters the dough and makes the bread what it is.“\(^ {163}\) Hadn’t the south Mediterranean countries trusted the EU they would have never allowed the launching of close cooperation programmes ranging from economy to political reforms.

There are several reasons that have contributed to Europe’s enjoying the status of legitimate and credible actor. First of all, the historical ties, geographical proximity and economic interdependency made Europe familiar and intimate to the south shore Mediterranean countries.\(^ {164}\) However, the most important reason that legitimizes Europe’s interference is undoubtedly the recognition made by the public opinion and

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161 Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, ibid. For the initial content of the Greater Middle East initiative see Nick Fiorenza, \textit{A greater NATO Role in the Greater Middle East}, ISIS Europe, NATO Notes, Vol.6, No.1, February 2004.
164 After all, condemned as they were by their geographical position those countries had no choice but look at the North for economical cooperation. Additionally, those countries desired their adherence to EMP and the European involvement in the region for practical reasons such as the fund absorbing and as the only route for modernization.
political community of MNC’s regarding EU’s policies and intentions and their differentiation from those of NATO and US. Analysts occasionally refer to Europe’s unique way of using its power in foreign policy with different labels, such as civilian power, soft power or normative power. All three concepts have been closely interlinked and are also reproduced by the EU itself with similar claims in various official texts including those concerning the EMP. Thus, instead of relying alone on the passive diffusion of its reputation that followed the positive performance dealing with the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU has sought to project and promote its norms and values displaying consistency and constancy in its foreign policy.

EMP’s use of practices that were free of any forms of coercion and the development of contractual relations that were product of mutual negotiations, covering a common agenda which also included civil society, convinced the south shore countries about Europe’s pure intentions and assisted to the initiative’s acceptance. Consequently, EU’s legitimacy is owed to its normative effectiveness which in turn “relies on the extent to which other actors accept the role that EU actors themselves project for themselves into international politics.” On the contrary,

165 “Legitimacy of the EU’s normative power is rooted in the judgment of the non-European other.” Christopher J. Bickerton, “Legitimacy through norms: the political limits of Europe's normative power”, (paper for EUSA conference Montreal 17-19 May 2007), 8.
166 For the way in which Europe and the EU are contrasted with the United States in the Arab Media see Michael Wintle ed., Imagining Europe, Europe and European Civilization as Seen from its Margins and by the Rest of the World, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2008).
167 Duchene’s ‘civilian power’ included the idea of pursuing the domestication or ‘normalization’ of international relations by tackling international problems within the sphere of contractual politics. Nye’s ‘soft power’ was related to forms of foreign policy influence which relied on cooptation, multilateral cooperation, institution-building, integration and the power of attraction. Introducing the idea of the EU as a normative power, Manners described the EU as a foreign policy actor intent on shaping, instilling, diffusing – and thus ‘normalizing’ – rules and values in international affairs through non coercive means.” Tocci, 1.
168 “Priorities of the cooperation are jointly decided by the Ministers of EU Member states and the Ministers from the South Mediterranean countries.” European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, An Overview of Programmes and Projects, 8.
169 However, some analysts insist that the partner countries maybe have agreed to follow the “acquis communautaire” only for instrumental reasons like material pay-offs such as access to markets, financial and technological aid, to access to human and symbolic capital and to the institutional “software” that is conducive to modernization. Emanuel Adlerand and Beverly Crawford, Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), IES, UC Berkeley, 30-32. Even if this is the case, a change of practices and discourse often leads those states that subsequently adopt them to embrace the norms and values, on which the EU practices and discourse are based.
MD’s discriminatory character, the near absence of non-military means, the small or zero investment of on human capital and the asymmetrical relationship regarding governance and ownership proved that NATO was either not capable or not interested in achieving a normative impact hence the likelihood to add some legitimacy was lost.

Finally, Europe’s legitimacy derives from the Arab’s expectations to gain support regarding the Palestinian issue. The EU’s commitment to international law and its values, and its attempt to define them as universal principles strikes a chord among the Arab states and makes the EU an acceptable interlocutor hence a desirable actor. Therefore, this almost open declared Palestinian support has the opposite effect to Israel which considers Europeans to be preoccupied against the Israeli-Palestinian problem. According to Harry Kney-Tal, who served as ambassador of Israel to EU and NATO, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the focal point of EU policy decisions regarding the region through which everything coming out of the broader Middle East is filtered, analyzed, classified and referred to” meaning that Israel is not receiving the treatment it deserves. Yet, this does not seem to be such important a reason to bring rupture in EU-Israel relations which by the way are the most developed in comparison with all the other partner countries.

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171 As NATO’s MD fact sheet proves, MDWP’s activities are pure military oriented with 85% of them to deal with interoperability and deployability of forces, armaments, defense reforms, joint exercises etc. NATO, Fact Sheet on the Mediterranean Dialogue, 2008.

172 A critical factor was also Europe’s refusal to participate in the Iraq invention of 2003 as it considered it to be a war of choice not a war of necessity.

5. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The fundamental changes that have taken place in the Mediterranean security environment over the past 20 years along with the concerns emanating from the south produced an escalating “security deficit” in the region that needed to be encountered. NATO’s recorded successful Cold War route brought out the Alliance as the most prominent security institution, yet the nature of the emerging Mediterranean security threats, way distant from the traditional military ones, called for a more sophisticated encounter beyond the traditional hard rhetoric NATO used to address.

The main finding derived from this comparative analysis is that the EMP is better suited to deal with the region since it qualifies the crucial criteria of legitimacy and inclusiveness that enhance its problems solving capacity. As proved in the previous chapters, the EU directly affected as it was, soon identified security, socioeconomic and cultural problems as multi-faceted and interlinked and attempted to build its strategic long term vision for the region on that reality. After experiencing centuries of warfare, Europeans knew that cooperation was the only route to shared security, peace and prosperity and for this reason embraced without exceptions all South shore Mediterranean countries.

By sharing understandings and meanings about political, economic, and social life and adopting the logic of positive spillovers among different domains, through its region-building approach, the EU proved what it had prided itself on being since its inception, “a distinctly different type of international actor.” The normative and non coercive methods selected to address the MNC’s based on positive conditionality and persuasion, and the recent applied joint ownership and co-governance endowed the Union with the necessary legitimacy and overall acceptance to act. This particular approach has been the EU’s comparative advantage that brought the EMP as the most ambitious and promising venture to deal mainly with the soft security

174 Tocci, ibid.
175 “In the last five years the holistic approach of the EU, as applied to the EMP, with its emphasis on non-military factors and stability (rather narrow security) has clearly emerged as the security approach that fits with Mediterranean fragmentation and specific requirements.” Alboni, “The Role of International Organisations in the Mediterranean,”10.
176 “The EMP offers the only political institution in the region where competence, legitimacy and resources are present.” Hans Gunter Brauch, ‘The Mediterranean Space and Boundaries’, in Antonio
issues. In a sense what Europe actually did was it took advantage of its own disadvantage\textsuperscript{177} - the lack of military capabilities - and by promoting its “softness” made its influence more discreet and legitimate from that of NATO. Thus, having the capacity of influencing patterns, EMP is nominated as the most prospective to produce tangible results in the future.

On the contrary, Mediterranean Dialogue’s performance so far has been ambivalent and to a considerable extent ineffective, boasting only for its military cooperation achievements. One of the major factors that influenced NATO’s success was its inconsistency in implementing its declared principle of inclusiveness. The non participation of several Mediterranean countries, including some key ones, downgraded the MD from region-wide initiative to a discriminating limited one while its recent expansion eastwards proved that NATO did not actually have a strategic vision for the region but rather a self-centered logic having the region serve the Alliance’s interest concerning energy security of supply and counter terrorism. Hence, the already low credibility and legitimacy NATO used to enjoy in the South Shore countries due to the USA’s predominant role in it, experienced additional loss and propagated misconceptions about the Alliance’s intentions.

Given the fact that the correlation among prosperity, stability, and security is profound NATO’s military oriented policies and the exclusively high level of contacts appeared to be unsuitable to address any soft security issue. Even the cooperation in the military sector, where the Dialogue bore some fruits, is actually a delusion since the motivation for engagement of the non democratic countries was the modernization and reinforcement of each country’s armed forces and the subsequent potential use of them to guarantee regime’s maintaining in power.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{177}“Limited by its capabilities as a “civilian power”, it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building a secure and stable environments and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather coercion.” Rosa Balfour, \textit{Rethinking Euromediterranean Political and Security Dialogue}, ISS Occasional Paper 52, 2004, 5.

\textsuperscript{178}“For many societies around the Mediterranean, security continues to be, above all, a matter of internal security, and many foreign and security policy questions derive importance from their ability to affect the stability of existing regimes. Along the Mediterranean's southern and eastern shores, political futures remain unresolved and many regimes are facing significant challenges to their legitimacy.” Lesser, “The Renaissance of Mediterranean Security?” 1.
5.1. The way forward: From complementarity euphemism to substantial complementarity

Despite the relative suitability of the EMP\(^{179}\), no one can omit its inherent lack of military capabilities. Although soft power is a necessary component of what it takes to promote reforms and cooperation, when it comes to keeping peace and stability sometimes it is proven insufficient; and the “hard stuff” is required as well. Consequently, the EU has either to work more on its declassification as a mediocre military power\(^{180}\) or seek a close cooperation with NATO. However, there is general agreement that no single initiative can carry the entire burden of encountering all sources of instability in the region, hence cooperation is Europe’s only choice.\(^{181}\)

Only the combination of both institutions and their respective policy tools can help avoid overlapping and produce substantial results. “Complementarity\(^{182}\) is the key word and each organization should concentrate its efforts on fields where it has a clear comparative advantage and something constructive to offer as a contribution to the solution of the problems in the Mediterranean region.”\(^{183}\)

The appropriate way of ensuring maximum effectiveness of complementarity and avoiding duplication, is the assignment of distinct roles in each institution. This division of labor could happen through the establishment of an official coordination body between them which will also include representation of the partner countries in order to ensure transparency.\(^{184}\) Such a coordination body will determine, in a case by case basis, the fitness of each initiative and examine the type and the level of institutional involvement. The most likely potential for synergy between the EMP and

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\(^{179}\) “The Euro-Mediterranean entity is the only and the most suitable bi- and multilateral forum that can tackle the most pressing problems in the region.” Demmelhuber, 12.

\(^{180}\) “Even if the Union finally develops a military capability, its civilian character remains intact in view of the secondary nature of its military means as opposed to the prime emphasis placed on economics and diplomacy.” R Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998) as in Tocci, 5.

\(^{181}\) On the other hand, “given the lack of unity in the perceptions of the countries in the Mediterranean and those powers with an interest in the area, it is unrealistic to assume that a single international organization can contend with the security challenges across the Mediterranean.” Stephen J. Blank, 97.

\(^{182}\) The paradox is that complementarity was stated in both initiatives’ official documents but so far the declared complementarity has not been translated into explicit political practice. As Costanza Musu argues “the Dialogue and the Partnership have traveled along parallel yet separate rails”. Musu, 5.


\(^{184}\) Care must be taken to avoid a situation in which NATO and the EU might give contradictory messages to their Mediterranean interlocutors. Sven Biscop, “Network or Labyrinth? The Challenge of Co-ordinating Western Security Dialogues with the Mediterranean.” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No.1, Spring, 2002,104 as in ibid.
the Dialogue, would be the former to privilege its socioeconomic nature and greater acceptance to promote political dialogue and collaboration on “soft security” issues, and the latter to address literally “hard security” issues where it is perceived as more credible, i.e. conflict prevention, peace keeping operations,\textsuperscript{185} counter terrorism and WMD, disaster relief and de-mining.

A strategic cooperation scheme like that could be proven mutually beneficial and create a win-win situation\textsuperscript{186} not only for the two initiatives that express the Western world and its concerns but also for the south shore countries. First of all this would be a unique opportunity for NATO to considerably amend its legitimacy defect. A cooperative and at the same time transparent relation with the EU\textsuperscript{187} could function as the safeguard clause for the partner countries and help persuade them that the Dialogue is sponsored by the organization in its entirety and not just certain members of it. The “labor division” would also set and clarify NATO’s limits of action hence guarantee that the Dialogue’s intentions are not self-interests dressed up as something else. Additionally, NATO could capitalize on the EU’s acceptance and know-how of social aspect to improve its profile and increase its influence where US acceptance is low.

Respectively, the EU will have considerable gains since not only will it be able to restrain and counterbalance USA’s dominating role in NATO and reduce friction within the EU regarding its relationship with NATO but will also utilize NATO’s operational experience in the field of preventive action and crisis management. Finally both initiatives will achieve better finance management and significant resource savings since they will no longer antagonistically invest in the same fields.

\textsuperscript{185} It must be clearly recognized and stipulated that the Mediterranean institutions are not committed to pursue collective security on inter-regional basis, this task remaining strictly in the hands of the UN and the Security Council; it must also be recognized that political conditions prevailing in the area do not allow, as of today, for a consensus on the assignment of collective security tasks to security organizations from regions other than the ones in need of interventions (in other words, a task could be assigned to NATO in relation to the necessity of intervening in Europe, but not in an Arab country); the role of Mediterranean institutions for the time being must be confined to create the premises for the implementation of a full fledged co-operative security zone, starting with the application of simple measures of co-operative security. Aliboni, “The Role of International Organisations in the Mediterranean,” 10.

\textsuperscript{186}Ralph Thiele et al. Mediterranean security after EU and NATO enlargement, A joint research project between Military Centre for Strategic Studies and Bundewehr Transformation Center, Roma 2005, 11.\textsuperscript{187}In general, NATO and the EU make very poor friends. Even though the membership of both institutions overlaps to a large degree (21 of the 27 EU member-states are also in NATO), the two barely talk. Worse, they compete for the member-states’ defense money, and for the attention of others.” Tomas Valasek, France, NATO and European defense, Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, 2008, 1.
On the other hand, all South Mediterranean Countries could have multiple benefits. The absence of overlapping between EMP and MD could minimize the confusing messages sent to the partner countries regarding each initiative’s intentions and therefore enhance confidence188 which in turn will lead to the familiarization with institutionalization processes and addiction to cooperation. At the same time the improved funding available and the capitalization of each institution’s know how regarding their fields of specialty would assist the implementation of country specific cooperation programmes covering all political, economic, social and military aspects.

In conclusion and using terms coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, it is more possible for the EU to achieve a transformation from soft power to smart power and hence become capable of dealing with all problems, than for NATO from hard to smart given the EU’s growing interest to be declassified as mediocre military power (ESDP) and NATO’s lack of legitimacy and non-military capabilities.189 Until this transformation takes place, if ever, the Mediterranean basin is unlikely to become an area of cooperation and security unless a more drastic and cooperative relation between the EMP and the MD is established. Competition leaves everybody worse off while the gravity of the security situation in the region necessitates rapid actions and longue durée. There is no room for complacency but there is plenty of room for both initiatives.

188 Lasting solutions must bind together all regional players with a common stake in security. Any exclusion would undermine and risk the overall success.

189 According to Raouf Saad NATO’s resort to soft security “unconventional to its modalities and operations” and hence especially in the case of the Mediterranean the label “smart power” is clearly a misnomer. Raouf Saad “Egypt and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Perceptions and Prospects”, in Maurizio Coccia ed., The 50 Years of NATO Seen from the Mediterranean Region (Rome, 1999) 77-78 as in Dokos, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 108.
ANNEX I

List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbour Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMP</td>
<td>Global Mediterranean Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Istanbul Cooperation Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Individual Cooperation Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG</td>
<td>Mediterranean Cooperation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDWP</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue Working Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Mediterranean non-member countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBM</td>
<td>Partnership Building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJC</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAVFORMED</td>
<td>Standing Naval Force Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Union of the Arab Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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ANNEX II

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